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Malcolm Lavoie*

R. v. Comeau and Section 121 of the
Constitution Act, 1867: Freeing the Beer
and Fortifying the Economic Union

A recent decision from the New Brunswick Provincial Court may have significant
implications for Canada's constitutional structure. R. v. Comeau held that s. 121
of the Constitution Act, 1867, the constitution's internal free trade provision,
prohibits both interprovincial tariffs as well as non-tariff trade barriers. In doing
so, the court departed from a line of precedents holding that s. 121 prohibits only
the erection of outright tariffs or duties on interprovincial trade. Ultimately the
court held that s. 134(b) of New Brunswick's Liquor Control Act, which effectively
prohibits the possession of all but small quantities of liquor purchased out of
province, constituted a non-tariff barrier in contravention of s. 121. The Supreme
Court of Canada recently granted leave to appeal. The author argues that the
judge was correct in holding that s. 121 should extend at least to some non-tariff
barriers. Yet the decision leaves important questions unanswered, including how
s. 121 can be reconciled with provincial regulatory authority how a construction
of s. 121 should be informed by the constitutional principles of democracy and
federalism, and how doctrine can be developed so as to appropriately distinguish
between permissible and impermissible non-tariff barriers. The author proposes
a framework that aims to reconcile the trial judge's analysis with these additional
considerations.

Une decision rdcente de la Cour provinciale du Nouveau-Brunswick pourrait avoir
d'importantes consequences pour la structure constitutionnelle du Canada. Dans
R. c. Comeau, le tribunal a declare que 'art. 121 de la Loi constitutionnelle de
1867, disposition de la Constitution traitant du libre-6change intbrieur interdit tant
'imposition de droits tarifaires interprovinciaux que les barrieres non tarifaires au
commerce. Ce faisant, le tribunal s'est bloignd de la jurisprudence qui soutient
que 'art. 121 interdit uniquement Iimposition de tarifs ou droits tarifaires sur le
commerce interprovincial. En fin de compte, le tribunal a jug6 que le par 134(b)
de la Loi sur la reglementation des alcools du Nouveau-Brunswick, qui interdit
carrdment la possession d'alcool achet6 ailleurs que dans la province, sauf de
tres petites quantitds, constitue une barriere non tarifaire, en contravention de
I'art. 121. La Cour suprdme du Canada a rdcemment accord6 la permission d'en
appeler de la decision. L'auteur fait valoir que le juge a eu raison de considdrer
que l'art. 121 doit sappliquer au moins a certains obstacles non tarifaires. La
decision laisse ndanmoins d'importantes questions en suspens : comment
I'art. 121 peut-il 6tre rapproch6 de Iorganisme de rdglementation provincial,
comment une interpretation de 'art. 121 devrait-elle s'inspirer des principes
constitutionnels de ddmocratie et de f~ddralisme, et comment la doctrine peutelle 6tre ddveloppde de fagon a ce que la distinction appropride puisse 6tre faite
entre les obstacles non tarifaires admissibles et les obstacles inadmissibles.
L'auteur propose un cadre qui vise a concilier I'analyse du juge de premiere
instance et ces considerations additionnelles.

* Assistant Professor, University of Alberta Faculty of Law. My thanks to two anonymous reviewers
for their thoughtful comments on this piece.
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Introduction
On 29 April 2016, the New Brunswick Provincial Court released a
decision with unusually significant implications for the political and
economic structure of Canadian federalism.' Though sometimes referred
to as the New Brunswick beer case, 2 because it involved a prosecution for
possession of beer imported from another province, R. v Comeau is about
a lot more than just alcoholic beverages. Put simply, the case concerned
whether section 121 of the Constitution Act, 1867 prohibits only the
levying of outright tariffs or duties on interprovincial trade, or whether
it also extends in some manner to bar non-tariff trade barriers, which can
include essentially any measure that serves to disadvantage trade from
outside a jurisdiction.3 Non-tariff barriers range from production and
sale quotas, to inspection requirements, to licensing schemes and other
regulatory standards that differ from one jurisdiction to the next. In
Comeau, the barrier in question was an effective ban on possession of
modest quantities of liquor purchased outside of New Brunswick.
Section 121 reads: "AllArticles ofthe Growth, Produce, or Manufacture
of any one of the Provinces shall, from and after the Union, be admitted
free into each of the other Provinces." Despite the open-ended wording of
section 121, several cases from the Privy Council and Supreme Court of
Canada, starting with Gold Seal v. Alberta, have construed the provision
in a restrictive manner, to prohibit only the erection of tariffs or duties on

1.

R v Comeau, 2016 NBPC 3 [Comeau].

2.

See, e.g., "New Brunswick judge dismisses charges in cross-border beer case" (29 April 2016),

online: Toronto Star <www.thestar.com>.

3.

ConstitutionAct, 1867 (UK), 30 & 31 Vict, c 3, s 121.
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interprovincial trade.' The trial judge in R v. Comeau, however, departed
from this line of precedent, relying on the "new evidence" exception
to vertical stare decisis articulated in Canada v. Bedford and Carter v.
Canada.' Judge Ronald LeBlanc held that the text, historical context,
and purpose of section 121 all lead to an interpretation that extends to
both tariff and non-tariff trade barriers. In relation to the case before the
court, that meant holding that s. 134(b) of the New Brunswick Liquor
Control Act, which prohibits possession of more than a small quantity
of alcohol not purchased from the New Brunswick Liquor Corporation,
violates section 121 of the ConstitutionAct, 1867.6 The defendant, a New
Brunswick man who had been charged under section 134(b) for stocking
up on cheap beer in Quebec and then returning to New Brunswick, was
therefore acquitted.
The provincial Crown sought leave to appeal the acquittal directly to
the New Brunswick Court of Appeal, attempting to bypass the Court of
Queen's Bench.'Remarkably, the Court of Appeal refused to grant leave.'
The Crown then sought leave to appeal to the Supreme Court of Canada,
which the court granted on 4 May 2017.9 The rather unusual result is
that the Supreme Court will hear an appeal on the merits of a case that
comes to it directly from a provincial court, a fact that underscores the
importance of the case. Indeed, given the amount of economic regulation
in Canada today that gives rise to non-tariff barriers to interprovincial
trade, both directly via overtly protectionist measures and indirectly via
such mechanisms as variable provincial production, transportation, and
licensing standards, this case could be one of the most significant the court
hears in the coming year.
The Comeau trial decision has already been the subject of significant
media commentary, much of it focusing on the implications for
4.
Gold Seal Ltd v Alberta (Attorney-General) (1921), 62 SCR 424 at 456, Duff J, 466, Anglin J,
and 469-470, Migneault J [Gold Seal]; Atlantic Smoke Shops Limited v Conlon, [1943] AC 550 at
567-570, Viscount Simon LC, [1943] 4 DLR 81 (PC) [Atlantic Smoke Shops]; Murphy v CPR, [1958]
SCR 626 at 634, Locke J, but see 638-643, Rand J, concurring, 15 DLR (2d) 145. See also Reference
re Agricultural ProductsMarketing, [1978] 2 SCR 1198 at 1224, 1261, 1266-1268, Laskin CJC, 84
DLR (3d) 257 [AgriculturalProductsMarketingReference], in whichLaskin CJC, writing for four of

nine judges, applies an approach to s 121 that is not restricted to tariffs. Other cases dealing with s 121
include Rv Nat Bell Liquors Ltd, 1922 [2] AC 128 (PC); Little vAttorney-GeneralofBritish Columbia

(1922), 65 DLR 297 (BC CA).
5.
Canada (Attorney General) v Bedford, 2013 SCC 72 at paras 38-44, [2013] 3 SCR 1101
[Bedford]; Carterv Canada (Attorney General), 2015 SCC 5 at para 44, [2015] 1 SCR 331 [Carter].

6.
Liquor ControlAct, RSNB 1973, c L-10.
7.
Kevin Bissett, "New Brunswick will appeal "groundbreaking" court decision that tossed limits
on alcohol importing" (27 May 2016), online: National Post < www.nationalpost.com>.
8.
R v Comeau, [2016] NBJ No 232 (CA).
9.
Rv Comeau, [2017] SCCANo 25.
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"

interprovincial alcohol sales specifically."o Some coverage, though, also
acknowledges the effect a holding like this could have on a range of other
regulatory schemes that interfere with interprovincial trade, including
supply-managed agriculture." In addition, academic commentators and
others have noted the markedly originalist orientation of the decision, in
the sense that the trial judge devotes a great deal of his judgment to the
legislative history and historical context of section 121.12 The trial decision
came at an auspicious time, only a month and a half before a Senate
report that called for the dismantling of interprovincial trade barriers and
specifically recommended a reference to the Supreme Court of Canada on
interprovincial trade barriers and the meaning of section 121.13 A motion
brought by the Official Opposition in the House of Commons similarly
called for a Supreme Court reference on section 121." Political momentum
towards reducing interprovincial trade barriers has only continued to grow,
as evidenced by the recently concluded federal-provincial CanadianFree
Trade Agreement.
This paper will argue that the trial judge in Comeau makes a compelling
case that the text, historical context, and purpose of section 121 all favour
an interpretation that extends both to tariffs and at least to some non-tariff
trade barriers. However, as has been observed elsewhere,1 6 Comeau also
leaves questions unanswered. Perhaps most significantly, the judgment

10. See, e.g., Alan White, "New Brunswick judge throws out cross-border booze limits" (29 April
2016), online: CBC News <www.cbc.ca/news>; Shane Fowler, "New Brunswickers thirsty for cheap
Quebec booze after court ruling" (2 May 2016), online: CBC News <www.cbc.ca/news>; Kevin
Bissett, "Beer sales in Quebec boost after New Brunswick cross-border ruling" (2 May 2016), online:
Toronto Star <www.thestar.com>; Graham Slaughter, "Uncorking old laws: Canadian wine could
soonbe sold across provinces, lawyer says" (29 April 2016), online: CTV. News <www ctvnews.ca>.
11. Marmi Soupcoff, "The Comeau decision is a 'big deal,' as it could lead to free trade in all of
Canada" (2 May 2016), online: National Post <www.nationalpost.com>.
12. Benjamin Oliphant, "Originalism, Beer, and Interprovincial Trade Barriers" (6 May 2016),
online: Policy Options <policyoptions.irpp.org/>; "Atoast to Canadian history, freer trade and cheaper
beer" (4 May 2016), online: Macleans <www.macleans.ca>. For other views on the case, see Asher
Honickman, "A Marriage Made in Britain: Section 121 and the Division of Powers" (21 October
2016), online: Advocates for the Rule of Law <www.ruleoflaw.ca>; Mark Mancini, "The Comeau
Decision is a Welcome Example of Serious Doctrinal Analysis" (3 August 2016), online: Advocates
for the Rule of Law <www.ruleoflaw.ca>.
13. Senate, Standing Senate Committee on Banking, Trade and Commerce, Tear Down These Walls:
DismantlingCanada's Internal Trade Barriers(June 2016) (Chair: David Tkachuk) [Senate Internal
Trade Report].

14. House of Commons Debates, 42nd Parl, 1st Sess, No 72 (14 June 2016) at 1020; Laura Payton,
"Liberals vote down 'free-the-beer' motion" (15 June 2016), online: CTV News <www ctvnews.ca>.
15. Janyce McGregor, "Premiers reach 'unprecedented' Canadian free-trade deal in Whitehorse,"
CBC News (22 July 2016), online: <www.cbc.ca/news>/; Canadian Free Trade Agreement
(ConsolidatedVersion) (2017), online: Internal Trade Secretariat <http://www.ait-aci.ca>.

16. Oliphant, supranote 12; Gary Gillman, "The Comeau case is not quite a game changer" (2 June
2016), online: National Post <www.nationalpost.com>.
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fails to outline how, exactly, constitutional doctrine can be developed so
as to prohibit some non-tariff trade barriers while still leaving space for
provincial and federal regulatory activity that affects interprovincial trade.
This is an important question. The very existence of regulatory regimes
that differ from one province to the next adds costs to interprovincial trade
and thus gives rise to non-tariff trade barriers. Presumably, section 121
cannot extend so far as to mandate a completely laissez-faire approach
to economic regulation. The prospect of developing doctrine to deal with
non-tariff barriers raises further questions not addressed by the trial judge.
One might ask how a robust interpretation of section 121 will fit within
the structure or "architecture" of the Constitution," including the existing
balance between provincial jurisdiction over property and civil rights and
the federal trade and commerce power. Relatedly, questions arise as to
the role of constitutional principles such as democracy and federalism,
which may be implicated given the potential for constitutional doctrine in
this area to restrict the ability of democratic majorities-especially at the
provincial level-to regulate the economy. Finally, by relying so heavily
on originalist reasoning, Judge LeBlanc's judgment might raise questions
from those who favour a "progressive" interpretation of the Constitution.
His reasons do not address the question of how changes in the values and
structure of the Constitution might inform a construction of the provision
based on text, original purpose and historical context alone.
This paper will proceed in five parts. In the next section, I briefly
summarize the key elements of the decision. Section II provides a
preliminary evaluation of the decision. Leaving aside questions relating
to vertical stare decisis, I argue that the trial judge is right to claim that
the text, purpose and context of section 121 all favour an interpretation
that extends to some non-tariff barriers. However, I also argue that he

17. To use the language ofthe Reference re Senate Reform, 2014 SCC 32, [2014] 1 SCR 704 [Senate
Reference].

18. It shouldbe noted that the degree and scope of relevance of changes ofthis nature is contested. For
instance, the claim that the Supreme Court of Canada has definitively rejected "originalist" reasoning
in constitutional cases has recently been persuasively called into question. See Benjamin Oliphant
& Leonid Sirota, "Has the Supreme Court of Canada Rejected 'Originalism'?" (2016) 42:1 Queen's
LJ 106; Leonid Sirota & Benjamin Oliphant, "Originalist Reasoning in Canadian Constitutional
Jurisprudence" 49:3 UBC L Rev [forthcoming in 2017]. As noted by Oliphant & Sirota, however,
many forms of "new" originalism do acknowledge the potential relevance of non-textual factors
like constitutional structure and principles to constitutional adjudication. For instance, these factors
might be relevant to the development of constitutional doctrine where the original public meaning
of the text employs vague or open-textured language. The analysis that follows in this article is thus
potentially relevant both on a "living constitutionalist" approach and on an "originalist" approach that
acknowledges the potential for the constitutional text to underdetermine outcomes in specific cases,
including possibly in relation to the development of doctrine on non-tariff barriers.
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leaves important questions unanswered, including those relating to
constitutional structure, constitutional values, the possible imperatives of
a "progressive" interpretation of the Constitution, and, ultimately, how to
develop doctrine in relation to non-tariff barriers. The rest of the paper
seeks to provide answers to these questions. Section III outlines the policy
objectives underlying a constitutional free trade provision, arguing that
section 121 aims at both the economic goal of increased prosperity as
well as political objectives relating to national unity. This section sets up
a tension between the objectives of the provision on the one hand, and the
competing principles of democratic governance and the federal structure
of the Constitution, on the other. Any interpretation of section 121 must
seek to resolve this tension in an appropriate manner, within the constraints
imposed by the text of the Constitution. Section IV of the paper then looks
to comparative constitutional jurisprudence for illustrations of how this
kind of tension can be resolved. Both Australia and the United States have
constitutional jurisprudence barring both interstate tariff and non-tariff
trade barriers. This section looks to see what lessons can be derived from
those countries' constitutional doctrines relating to non-tariff barriers.
Section V draws upon the theoretical and comparative analysis
in the preceding sections, and proposes a means of reconciling the
text and purpose of section 121 with Canada's constitutional structure
and principles. I argue that the essence of section 121 is a prohibition
against discriminatory protectionism in relation to interprovincial trade.
Accordingly, a conceptual distinction should be drawn between two
types of measures, which should be assessed differently. Measures that
discriminate on their face against interprovincial trade, either by relying
on geographic distinctions directly or by using geographic proxies, should
be subject to exacting scrutiny. Such measures should only be upheld if
they are necessary for the achievement of a significant, non-protectionist
policy objective. By contrast, measures that do not rely on geographic
distinctions, either directly or through proxies, but which nevertheless
negatively affect interprovincial trade, should be subject to a less exacting
review. These measures should be upheld so long as they bear a rational
and functional relationship to the achievement of a valid, non-protectionist
objective. This provides an interpretation consistent with the text and
purpose of section 121, but which also respects provincial legislative
authority and the constitutional values of democracy and federalism.
Finally, while section 121 should be interpreted so as to provide reasonable
guards against protectionist provincial legislation affecting interprovincial
trade, I also argue that section 121 does not restrict Parliament's section
91(2) power over trade and commerce. This is consistent with the text of
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section 91 of the Constitution Act, 1867, which states that Parliament's
section 91 powers exist "notwithstanding anything in this Act." It is also
consistent with constitutional principles of democracy and federalism in
that it ensures that a democratic body not beholden to provincial interests
is able to regulate interprovincial trade in the public interest.
I. The decision
Comeau was the product of a two-day enforcement operation undertaken
by the RCMP Campbellton Detachment. The operation targeted New
Brunswickers who entered Qu6bec to buy liquor and then returned to New
Brunswick. While this was apparently a common practice in the area, in
light of the lower prices available on the Qu6bec side of the border, the
practice seemed to contravene section 134(b) of the Liquor Control Act,
which states: "Except as provided by this Act or the regulations, no person,
within the Province, by himself, his clerk, employee, servant or agent
shall... (b) have or keep liquor, not purchased from the Corporation."1 9
Section 43 of the Act provides an exemption for small quantities of outof-province liquor, namely an amount under one bottle of liquor or twelve
pints of beer.2 0 The defendant, G6rard Comeau, travelled from his home in
New Brunswick to the Qu6bec side of the border, where he was observed
entering stores that sold liquor. Upon crossing the bridge back to New
Brunswick, his car was pulled over by the RCMP, at which time they
discovered 15 cases of beer and three bottles of spirits. These were seized,
and Comeau was issued a ticket under section 134(b), an offence with a
minimum fine of $240.21
At trial, Comeau's principal argument was that section 134(b) of
the provincial Act constitutes a barrier to interprovincial trade which
contravenes section 121 of the ConstitutionAct, 1867. The main obstacle
to the success of this argument was a series of precedents from the
Supreme Court of Canada and Judicial Committee of the Privy Council,
starting with Gold Seal, which held that section 121 prohibits only the
establishment of duties or tariffs on interprovincial trade.22 Since the trial
judge ultimately concluded that section 134(b) could not be construed as a
tariff,23 he was forced to consider whether section 121 also prohibited nontariff trade barriers. The "barrier" in question in this case was an effective

19. Supra note 6.
20. Ibid.
21. Comeau, supranote 1 at paras 9, 13.
22. Gold Seal, supra note 4 at 456, 466, and 469-470; Atlantic Smoke Shops, supra note 4 at 567570; Murphy v CPR, supra note 4 at 634.
23. Comeau, supranote 1 at paras 166-168.
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prohibition on possession of certain amounts of alcohol purchased outside
the province. Given that the defendant was charged only under provincial
legislation, the trial judge declined to assess the constitutionality of
section 3 of the federal Importation of Intoxicating Liquors Act, which
prohibits the act of importing liquor into a province except on behalf of the
government of the province in question.2 4
Judge LeBlanc begins his analysis by considering how to interpret
section 121 from first principles, only later going on to contend with the
precedents in the Gold Seal line of cases. He sets out general statements
of constitutional interpretation, endorsing a progressive and purposive
interpretation, with proper regard to the text, legislative history, scheme of
the Act, and legislative context. 2 5 Noting first that the wording of section
121 does not qualify the term "admitted free" in any manner that would
limit its application to tariffs or duties, 26 Judge LeBlanc observes that over
the course of its drafting history, restrictions on the scope of the provision
were actually removed. For instance, while the provision initially referred
to goods being admitted free "into all Ports in Canada," it later read "into
each of the other Provinces."2 7 Perhaps most persuasively, the judge,
relying on expert historical evidence, notes that the language of the
provision mirrors the language of pre-Confederation reciprocal free trade
statutes among the British North American colonies, with an important
difference. While the pre-Confederation enactments provided that articles
of "growth, production or manufacture" were to be admitted "free from
Duty," section 121 states that they are to be "admitted free," without the
"duty" qualifier.28 The judge finds this to be a significant indication going
to the meaning of the provision, showing that it was not limited in scope to
the removal of tariff-based trade barriers.2 9 While the judge acknowledges
that section 121 is found in Part VIII of the ConstitutionAct, 1867, entitled
"Revenues, Debts, Assets, Taxation," he does not regard this as limiting
the scope of section 121 to fiscal matters. Rather, Part VIII is said to be
the best fit for section 121, a provision that does not easily fit in any of the
other sections of the ConstitutionAct, 1867.30
Having concluded that the text of the provision suggests an
interpretation that extends beyond tariffs, the judge goes on to consider

24.
25.
26.
27.
28.
29.
30.

RSC 1985, c 1-3; ibid at paras 19-20.
Comeau, ibid at paras 41-48.
Ibid at paras 53, 177.
Ibid at para 60.
Ibid at paras 61-62.
Ibid at paras 63, 179-181.
Ibid at para 68.
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the historical context of the Act. Again relying on expert evidence, he
notes that the creation of a free trade area was a central political concern
at the time of Confederation, and that the mid-19th century was a time of
widespread belief in the free trade, particularly in Britain and its colonies.3 1
More particularly, the trial judge observes that Canadian politicians at the
time of Confederation were aware of the importance of removing both
tariff and non-tariff trade barriers, in light of the use of non-tariff "search
and detain protocols" by the United States under the Reciprocity Treaty
that was in force from 1854 to 1865.32 Citing contemporary speeches by
politicians outlining the centrality of an internal free trade area to the
Confederation project, along with the historical context more generally,
the trial judge holds that the purpose of section 121 was to provide for a
robust conception of free trade, extending to non-tariff barriers.3 3
While the text, purpose, and historical context of section 121 are all
said to indicate that it is not limited to tariffs, the trial judge acknowledges
precedent from the Gold Seal line of cases to the effect that the provision
should be so limited. However, Judge LeBlanc then goes on to consider
the exception to vertical stare decisis that the Supreme Court laid out in
Bedford and Carter.3 4 This exception allows trial courts to reconsider
settled rulings of higher courts "where a new legal issue is raised" or "where
there is a change in the circumstances or evidence that fundamentally
shifts the parameters of the debate." 3 5 The trial judge concludes that there
was neither a truly new legal issue raised before him, nor have "new
circumstances" arisen since Gold Seal.3 6 However, the trial judge holds
that he was presented with "new evidence" in the case, relating to "the
drafting of the British North America Act, the legislative history of the
Act, the scheme of the Act, and its legislative context."3 7 This evidence
was not before the court in Gold Seal, where the court dealt with section
121 in a rather perfunctory manner.3 8 Accordingly, following Bedford and
Carter,the trial judge determines that the court should not be bound by the
Gold Seal line of precedent in interpreting section 121.39 While the judge
was also presented with some evidence that the court in Gold Seal was

31.
32.
33.
34.
35.
36.
37.
38.
39.

Ibid at paras 81, 89.
Ibid at paras 78-80.
Ibid at paras 90, 101, 182-186.
Bedford, supra note 5 at paras 38-44; Carter,supra note 5 at 44.
Comeau, supranote 1 at paras 119-120, citing Carter, ibid.
Comeau, ibid, at paras 123-124.
Ibid at para 125.
Ibid at paras 115-116.
Ibid at para 125.
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improperly influenced by the federal Justice Minister, he does not rely on
this as a basis for revisiting the decision.40
Ultimately, Judge LeBlanc holds that section 121 prohibits the erection
of both tariffs and non-tariff barriers to trade." While he acknowledges
that this finding may significantly limit provincial legislative authority,
and disrupt long-standing arrangements relating to economic policy in
this country,4 2 he concludes that a faithful interpretation of the provision
requires such an approach. He holds that section 134(b) constitutes a trade
barier in contravention of section 121 of the ConstitutionAct, 1867, and is
therefore of no force or effect. The charge against Comeau is consequently
dismissed.
II. Unanswered questions
This is a startling opinion in a number of respects. Of course, the very fact
that the court explicitly departs from what it regards as binding precedent
makes it unusual, 43 although perhaps not as unusual as it might have been
prior to Bedford. Whether historical evidence relating to the drafting
history and historical context of a constitutional provision can be said to
constitute "new evidence" for the purposes of Bedford is an open question.
The Supreme Court in that case, and in Carter, seemed more concerned
with new evidence going to the nature and proportionality of Charter
infringements than evidence going to the drafting history and historical
context of a constitutional provision. There may be no principled reason to
exclude this type of evidence from the "new evidence" exception, but this
is a question that may have to be addressed on appeal.
40. Ibid at para 190.
41. Ibid at para 191.
42. Ibidatparas 156-161.
43. It is worth noting that the question of whether the court was actually bound by the Gold Seal
interpretation of s 121 is at least somewhat ambiguous. It is true that the majority opinions in Gold
Seal and two subsequent high court cases adopt an approach to s 121 that would prohibit only tariffs.
Gold Seal, supra note 4 at 456, 466, 469-470; Atlantic Smoke Shops, supra note 4 at 567-570; Murphy
v CPR, supra note 4 at 634. However, in Murphy v CPR, Rand J, in a concurring opinion, articulates
an approach to s 121 that encompasses non-tariff barriers. Supra note 4 at 638-643. In his view s
121 prohibits measures that restrict trade and that in their "essence or purpose" relate to a provincial
boundary, regardless of whether they constitute a "tariff." He contrasts such measures with those that
regulate mere "incidents" of trade, which are permitted. In the most recent Supreme Court of Canada
case to deal with s 121, the Agricultural Products Marketing Reference, Laskin CJC, writing for
four of nine judges, applies and appears to endorse Rand J's approach, though he also mentions the
more restrictive interpretation from Gold Seal. Referring to Rand J's concurring opinion, he writes:
"Accepting this view of s 121, I find nothing in the marketing scheme here that, as a trade regulation,
is in its essence and purpose related to a provincial boundary." Supra note 4 at 1268, emphasis in
original. Pigeon J's majority opinion in the AgriculturalProductsMarketingReference is essentially a
gloss onLaskin CJ's opinion, and does not address s 121 at all. While Laskin CJC was not technically
writing for a majority in the Agricultural ProductsMarketing Reference, he was not contradicted by

the majority in relation to s 121.
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Beyond issues relating to vertical stare decisis, the Comeau decision
is also startling in its potential policy implications, and in the potential
uncertainty it portends. The trial judge acknowledges this, stating at
various points that "[t]he interpretation of section 121 sought by the
defence amounts to a request to this Court to dismantle a regime that
has been in place since the inception of the Constitution in 1867," and
. . interpreting section 121... as permitting the free movement of goods
among the provinces without barriers, tariff or non-tariff, will have a
resounding impact." 4 Despite the significant potential policy implications
of the decision, the trial judge offers little in the way of clarity as to
specifically how impermissible non-tariff barriers are to be identified, at
one point noting simply that "[h]ow this would play out would no doubt
be the subject of much political maneuvering and court interpretations."
This is probably true, but setting out a framework for analysis might have
helped reduce the associated uncertainty.
All that said, the analysis of section 121 offered by the trial judge in
light of the text, purpose and historical context of the provision is actually
quite persuasive. The ultimate source for many of the arguments and
evidence put forward at trial and accepted by the court appears to be a series
of articles on section 121 by Ian Blue.4 6 In these articles, Blue, like the trial
judge, relying mostly on the drafting history, historical context, purpose,
and text of section 121, argues that section 121 was misinterpreted in Gold
Seal. A purposive interpretation of section 121, according to Blue, would
encompass both tariff and non-tariff trade barriers. 7
It is difficult to contradict the arguments of Blue and the trial judge
on these specific points. The plain meaning of section 121 is not restricted
to tariffs. The text says goods are to be "admitted free," and tariffs are
only one way that free trade can be impeded. This position is reinforced
by the drafting history, which seems to indicate that the narrower "free
from duty" language from colonial free trade enactments would have
been considered and rejected in favour of the broader "admitted free"
language. The historical context of Confederation further underscores
that the concept of non-tariff trade barriers would have been familiar to
44. Comeau, supranote 1 at paras 158, 191.
45. Ibid at para 161.
46. Ian Blue, "Long Overdue: A Reappraisal of Section 121 of the ConstitutionAct, 1867" (2010) 33
Dal LJ 161 ["Long Overdue"]; Jan Blue, "On the Rocks? Section 121 of the ConstitutionAct, 1867,
and the Constitutionality of the Importation ofIntoxicatingLiquorsAct" (2009) 35 Advocates' Q 306;
Jan Blue, "On the Rocks; The Gold Seal Case: A Surprising Second Look" (2010) 36 Advocates' Q
363; lan Blue, Free Trade within Canada:Say Goodbye to Gold Seal (May 2011), online: MacdonaldLaurier Institute <http://www.macdonaldlaurier.ca>.
47. Blue, "Long Overdue," ibid, at 191.
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the drafters, such that the broad language of the provision was designed
specifically so that it would catch non-tariff barriers. Moreover, one of the
central, overriding purposes of Confederation was to create a free trade
zone. An interpretation of section 121 that does not extend to any nontariff trade barriers would be utterly inimical to this purpose, by allowing
governments to do indirectly-through quotas, discriminatory regulation,
outright prohibitions on imported goods, and other means-what they
cannot do directly through tariffs.
The location of section 121 in Part VIII, entitled "Revenues, Debts,
Assets, Taxation," might give one pause. One could argue, as the prosecution
did, that the provision's scope is limited to fiscal matters. Perhaps the
provision simply serves to rule out tariffs on interprovincial trade as a
source of revenue. Yet this is unconvincing. A tariff on interprovincial
trade would likely be construed as a form of indirect taxation, and thus
beyond the jurisdiction of provincial legislatures." At least as regards
provincial measures, if section 121 were construed as only applying to
fiscal matters, it would be superfluous.
Further, headings such as the one in Part VIII are normally given only
limited weight in statutory and constitutional interpretation. 4 9 At the time
the Constitution Act, 1867 was passed by the British Parliament, titles
and marginal notes were not viewed as forming part of the authoritative
statutory enactment.50 Moreover, the location of the provision in Part
VIII can be explained by the fact that section 121 does, in part, relate
to government revenues in that it clearly rules out a source of revenue:
interprovincial tariffs. But that is not the same thing as saying that this is
all that section 121 does. As there was no other part of the Act that would
more appropriately capture the idea of free trade among the provinces, the
provision may simply have been placed in Part VIII because there was
nowhere better to put it. If there had been a section entitled "Interprovincial
Trade" and section 121 had not been placed there, but rather had been
placed in a section dealing with government revenues, then perhaps one

48.

See Gerard V La Forest, The Allocation of Taxing Power under the CanadianConstitution, 2nd

ed (Toronto: Canadian Tax Foundation, 1981) at 179-180. In making this point, La Forest merely
seeks to argue that courts have been comfortable with a restrictive interpretation of what constitutes
an impermissible barrier under s 121 because the limit on indirect taxation precludes many forms of
provincial fiscal interference with interprovincial trade. He also notes that this limit on provincial
indirect taxation may explain why s 121 emerged so late in the drafting process of the ConstitutionAct,
1867, despite the fact that free trade was a high priority for the framers.
49.

Ruth Sullivan, Sullivan on the Construction of Statutes, 6th ed (Toronto: LexisNexis, 2014) at

464-465; Law Society of Upper Canadav Skapinker, [1984] 1 SCR 357 at 376-377, 9 DLR (4th) 161.
50. See Peter Benson Maxwell, On the InterpretationofStatutes (London: Maxwell & Son, 1875) at
33-35. This is the traditional common law approach Sullivan, ibid at 460.
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could infer that section 121 related only to fiscal matters, not to trade more
generally. As it stands, though, the simplest explanation for the location
of section 121 seems to be that Part VIII was the best fit for the provision,
although it was not a perfect fit." In any event, a heading seems a slender
basis on which to contradict convincing evidence based on the text,
historical context, legislative history, and purpose of the provision.
Accordingly, both Blue and the trial judge appear to be correct
in arguing that the text, context, and purpose of section 121 yield an
interpretation contrary to Gold Seal. In other words, it seems as though
the provision must extend at least to some non-tariff barriers. How, then,
did the court in Gold Seal get things wrong? In part, the answer lies with
the manner in which section 121 was addressed in that case. As the trial
judge observes, Gold Seal dealt primarily with whether a part of the
federal Canada TemperanceAmending Act had been validly proclaimed.5 2
Section 121 was an afterthought in Gold Seal, raised for the first time
during oral arguments at the Supreme Court of Canada. The judges in
Gold Seal deal with section 121 in a perfunctory manner, in the course
of arriving at a judgment in an appeal that had seemingly been rendered
moot by the retroactive Proclamation Validation Act.53 Neither of the
subsequent Supreme Court and Privy Council cases that adopt the Gold
Seal interpretation analyzes the provision in any depth."4 In other words, it
is entirely plausible that, as Blue argues, the Supreme Court erred in Gold
Seal, and this error was carried forward more or less uncritically in two
subsequent high court treatments of the provision.
Yet for all its strength in dealing with the text, historical context, and
purpose behind section 121, Judge LeBlanc's decision leaves several
crucial questions unanswered. Most pressingly, as alluded to above, it
fails to provide a mechanism for determining when a government policy
or action will be found to constitute an impermissible non-tariff barrier.
This is a complex question, one that has been the source of a great deal
of uncertainty, litigation, and doctrinal development in the United States
and Australia-jurisdictions whose constitutions have been interpreted to
bar non-tariff trade barriers between states." Moreover, non-tariff trade
51. This is the explanation accepted by the trial judge. Comeau, supra note 1 at para 68.
52. RSC 1906, c 152.
53. SC 1921 (11 & 12 Geo V), c 20.
54. Atlantic Smoke Shops, supra note 4 at 567-570; Murphy v CPR, supra note 4 at 634. Justice
Rand's concurring opinion inMurphyv CPR does examine the provision in some depth, but he departs
from the restrictive Gold Seal approach. Supra note 4 at 638-643.
55.

See Suri Ratnapala & Jonathan Crowe, AustralianConstitutionalLaw: Foundationsand Theory,

3rd ed (Melbourne: Oxford University Press, 2012) at 303-315; Erwin Chemerinsky, Constitutional
Law: Principlesand Policies, 5th ed (New York: Aspen, 2015) at 443-478.
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barriers are often the subject of intricate negotiations and interpretations
in international trade agreements.56 If section 121 is to be extended to
non-tariff barriers, the next question is how constitutional doctrine will
be developed so as to distinguish impermissible trade barriers from valid
exercises of provincial (or federal) regulatory authority. Unfortunately,
Judge LeBlanc makes little attempt to show how this can be done. The
uncertainty that this creates may alone be enough to lead some observers to
prefer the relative clarity of a bright-line distinction that prohibits outright
tariffs but permits everything else.
Other, related questions emerge with respect to constitutional structure,
constitutional values, and the demands of a "progressive" interpretation
of the Constitution. In terms of constitutional structure, one might ask
what this interpretation of section 121 means for provincial legislatures'
jurisdiction over property and civil rights, and for the balance between
federal and provincial spheres of jurisdiction. All non-uniform provincial
regulations can add to the cost oftrading across provincial borders, and thus
can be construed as non-tariff trade barriers. More specifically, as argued
at trial, differential licensing, production, transportation, and marketing
standards across provinces all create barriers to trade." In addition,
certain forms of regulation and market intervention, including supply
management in agriculture and various economic development schemes,
may require giving privileged market access to in-province suppliers or
restricting supply from outside the province. The creation of governmentrun or government-backed monopolies on certain products, like alcohol or
marijuana, may also require restrictions on out-of-province suppliers. Due
to the geographic limits of provincial jurisdiction, interprovincial barriers
to trade are much more likely to arise when regulatory policies are pursued
at the provincial level than at the federal level.
Accordingly, one structural concern that a robust interpretation of
section 121 raises is that it might unduly restrict provinces' ability to
regulate the economy according to local values and concerns, while having
the practical effect of redistributing regulatory power to Parliament,
which is in a much better position to create uniform regulations across the
country. The concern is particularly acute given the significant regulatory
apparatuses that have been built up at the provincial level over the past
century. Canada's constitutional structure long ago departed from the
56. See, e.g., NorthAmerican Free TradeAgreement, 1 January 1994, arts 301, 1202, online: Global
Affairs Canada <www.international.gc.ca/>; Re Cross-Border Trucking Services (Mexico v United

States) (2001), USA-MEX-98-2008-01 (Ch 20 Panel), online: NAFTA Secretariat <www.nafta-secalena.org/>.
57. Supra note 1 at para 152.
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centralized vision of many of the framers. While this is seen most clearly
in the broad interpretation given to the provincial power over property and
civil rights, and the correspondingly narrow interpretation given to the
federal trade and commerce power, the Gold Seal approach to section 121
could also be seen as part of this trend.
In establishing regulatory schemes, provinces have implicitly relied on
anarrow construction of section 121, as well as on the body ofjurisprudence
dealing with provinces' ability to affect matters within Parliament's section
91(2) jurisdiction over interprovincial trade. " Canadian constitutional
jurisprudence has struck a fine balance between the federal power over
trade and commerce and provincial powers over property and civil rights;
and political actors have also played their part in giving practical effect
to the division of powers through legislation, executive agreements, and
cooperative schemes. The approach to section 121 adopted by the trial
judge threatens to shift the structure of federalism, as well as the structure
of economic regulation in Canada. The trial judge actually acknowledges
this concern, but does not really address it.5 9 Accordingly, one might well
ask how section 121 can be interpreted in a manner that is consistent with
the structure of Canadian federalism.
Another set of questions relates to constitutional principles.
Among the core principles that underlie the Constitution and guide its
interpretation are federalism and democracy.6 0 Federalism is implicated
in that Comeau may have the practical effect of redistributing power to
Parliament, albeit arguably in a manner consistent with the drafters' vision
of a strong economic union. But perhaps even more significantly, section
121 may be seen to limit the scope of democratic action. Constitutionally
entrenched economic rights are controversial for this very reason.6 1 While
the tension between democratic and communitarian values, on the one

58.

The key cases on the limits of provincial power to affect interprovincial trade include Home

Oil DistributorsLtd vAttorney-General ofBritish Columbia, [1940] SCR 444, [1940] 2 DLR 609;
CarnationCompanyLimitedv Quebec AgriculturalMarketingBoard, [1968] SCR 238, 67 DLR (2d)
1; Attorney-Generalfor Manitoba v Manitoba Egg and PoultryAssociation, [1971] SCR 689, 19
DLR (3d) 169 [Manitoba Egg Reference]; Agricultural Products Marketing Reference, supra note
4; Central CanadaPotash Co Ltd v Government of Saskatchewan, [1979] 1 SCR 42, 88 DLR (3d)

609. See also Peter W Hogg, ConstitutionalLaw of Canada, 5th ed Supp (Toronto: Carswell, 2007)
at 21-16 to 21-23; George Vegh, "The Characterization of Barriers to Interprovincial Trade under the
Canadian Constitution" (1996) 34 Osgoode Hall LJ 355 at 355-375.
59. Supra note 1 at paras 156-161.
60. Reference re Secession of Quebec, [1998] 2 SCR 217 at 247-257, 161 DLR (4th) 385; Senate
Reference, supra note 17 at para 25.
61. See, e.g., Saskatchewan Federationof Labour v Saskatchewan, 2015 SCC 4 at paras 116-118,

Rothstein and Wagner JJ, dissenting, [2015] 1 SCR 245; Lochner v New York, 198 US 45 at 65-66,
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hand, and negative economic liberties, on the other, has been more often
explored in the context of constitutionally entrenched property rights,62
David Schneiderman has observed that similar tensions exist with respect
to constitutional free trade protections.63 There is simply no question that
a robust interpretation of the Constitution's free trade provision would
restrict the power of democratic majorities, especially at the provincial
level, to set economic policies. Certain types of intervention, particularly
those aiming at price control through supply management or at protecting
local industries, will be more difficult or impossible to implement without
discriminating against trade from outside the province. This is not to say
that such policies are necessarily good or worthy pursuits. It is merely
to observe that democratic majorities are more constrained in setting
economic policy under a robust interpretation of section 121 than they
otherwise would be. The trial judge does not address how a balance is to
be struck between governments' power to regulate the economy and the
constitutional protection against trade barriers, an important consideration
given the democratic values that animate the Constitution.
Next, one might ask, what about a progressive interpretation of the
constitution? It has already been observed that while the court in Comeau
"starts out its analysis by singing from the Canadian constitutional hymnal,"
with references to the "living tree" and a progressive interpretation, the
nuts and bolts of the decision do not necessarily reflect this. 64 The trial
judge's overarching concern seems to be with the meaning and purpose
of section 121 in 1867. The original purpose, historical context, and
original public meaning of the text are obviously important, and are often
determinative. Yet even a skeptic of progressive interpretation would
have to acknowledge, as the trial judge does, Supreme Court precedent
to the effect that the "living tree" is supposed to inform constitutional
interpretation in this country.65 So one might readily ask how the
evolution in Canada's constitutional structure and values over the past
150 years should inform our understanding of section 121. For instance,
Alexander Alvaro has observed that in the time since Confederation,
Canadian political and constitutional values have shifted away from a
preoccupation with property rights and negative economic liberty and
62. See, e.g., Alexander Alvaro, "Why Property Rights Were Excluded from the Canadian Charter
of Rights and Freedoms" (1991) 24(2) Can J Political Science 309; Richard W Bauman, "Living in a
Material World: Property Rights in the Charter" (1991) 3(1) Const Forum 49.
63. David Schneiderman, "Economic Citizenship and Deliberative Democracy: An Inquiry into
Constitutional Limitations on Economic Regulation" (1995) 21 Queen's U 125 at 151-165.
64. Oliphant, supra note 12.
65. See, e.g., Reference re Same-Sex Marriage,2004 SCC 79 at paras 21-23, [2004] 3 SCR 698. But
see Oliphant & Sirota, supra note 18; Sirota & Oliphant, supra note 18.
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toward "democratic-communitarian" values that privilege the power of
democratic majorities to set economic policy in the public interest.6 6 While
it is certainly possible to contest this historical narrative,6 7 the challenge
this could pose to the Comeau interpretation of section 121 should be
apparent. Something should be said about how a proposed construction
of section 121 can be reconciled with Canada's present-day constitutional
structure and values, in order to persuade those committed to progressive
constitutional interpretation.
Finally, Comeau raises the question of what a constitutionally
entrenched free trade provision is for. This is an important question,
particularly if one seeks to reconcile section 121 with the competing
imperatives of constitutional values and constitutional structure. In other
federations with constitutionally entrenched free trade provisions, a
number of purposes have been seen to underlie these protections, including
economic efficiency, fostering national unity, protecting unrepresented
out-of-state interests, and preventing trade wars among states.6 8 Greater
clarity as to the purposes that section 121 aims to promote would help us
understand which non-tariff barriers specifically should be prohibited.
Assuming that Judge LeBlanc's call to reconsider the Gold Seal line of
precedent is heeded, the questions set out above will have to be confronted
sooner or later. In what follows, I will show how the questions raised by
the trial judge's able but incomplete analysis can be answered.
III. What is free tradefor?
Judge LeBlanc makes a persuasive case that the purpose behind section
121 was the creation of a free trade area for the newly united Canada. But
why free trade? This section seeks to outline the policy objectives that lie
behind the free trade provision, with the goal of clarifying its effect on
non-tariff barriers. I also aim to show the extent to which a commitment
to free trade continues to accord with the present-day values of Canadian
society.
The first and most prominent objective associated with free trade is
economic efficiency. Free trade has long been defended on the basis that
it enhances prosperity by allowing different regions to produce goods

66. Alvaro, supra note 62 at 310-317.
67. See Dwight Newman & Lorelle Binnion, "The Exclusion of Property Rights from the Charter:
Correcting the Historical Record" (2015) 52 Alta L Rev 543 at 546-550.
68. Donald Regan, "The Supreme Court and State Protectionism: Making Sense of the Dormant
Commerce Clause" (1986) 84 MichL Rev 1091 at 1112-1116; Amelia Simpson, "Grounding the High
Court's Modem Section 92 Jurisprudence: The Case for Improper Purpose as the Touchstone" (2005)
Fed L Rev 445 at 463-465; John Hart Ely, Democracy and Distrust: A Theory of JudicialReview

(Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1980) at 83-84.
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and services in line with their comparative advantage in the production
process, that is, their cost of production in various products relative to
other regions.69 By creating larger markets for goods, free trade can also
help lower costs of production overall and increase competition among
suppliers. Free trade is therefore seen by most economists as welfareenhancing. These are not novel insights, and would have been familiar
to politicians drafting a constitution during the heyday of classical liberal
political and economic thought. Indeed, the wealth-generating potential
of a Canadian free trade zone is clearly a prominent consideration in the
Confederation-era speeches cited by the trial judge."
The economic case for tree trade continues to resonate across a
relatively wide swath of the political spectrum in Canada. Following
the Canada-US Free Trade Agreement of 1988, Canada has entered
into a number of international free trade deals, including recent farreaching agreements with the European Union and a coalition of Pacific
Rim nations.n At the same time, efforts to reduce internal trade barriers
have been undertaken. The 1995 Agreement on Internal Trade was a
start, though one hobbled with exceptions and limited enforcement
mechanisms.72 The more ambitious New West Partnership among Western
Canadian provinces is another prominent example of efforts to lower trade
barriers so as to enhance economic efficiency. 3 The federal government
and the provinces recently reached an agreement to lower trade barriers in
a broader array of sectors than those covered by the Agreement on Internal

69.

See, e.g., David Ricardo, On the PrinciplesofPoliticalEconomy and Taxation, 3rd ed (London:

John Murray, 1821) at 139.
70. Comeau, supra note 1 at paras 92, 95, 96, citing a speech by George Brown on 12 September
1864, a speech by John A Macdonald on 7 February 1865, and a speech by Alexander Galt on
12 September 1867. The speeches, originally cited by Blue, "Long Overdue," supra note 46, may
be found in: Edward Whalen, ed, The Union of the British Provinces, A BriefAccount of the Several
ConferencesHeld in the Maritime Provinces and in Canada, in September and October 1864, on the
Proposed Confederation of the Provinces, Together with a Report of the Speeches, delivered by the
Delegatesfrom the Provinces, on ImportantPublic Occasions (Charlottetown: GT Haszard, 1865) at
36-37, 47-48; Canada, Parliament, ParliamentaryDebates on the Subject of the Confederation of the
British North America Provinces at 27-28.
71. Canada-European Union: Comprehensive Economic and Trade Agreement, 5 August 2014,

online: Global Affairs Canada <www.international.gc.ca/>; Trans-Pacific Partnership, 5 October
2015, online: Global Affairs Canada <www.international.gc.ca/>.
72. Agreement on Internal Trade, 1 July 1995, online: Agreement on Internal Trade <www.ait-aci.
ca/>; Agreement on Internal Trade Implementation Act, SC 1996, c 17. For criticism of some of the

shortcomings of the Agreement, see Vegh, supra note 58 at 405-4 10.
73. New West Partnership Trade Agreement, 1 July 2010, online: New West Partnership Trade
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Trade.7 ' This agreement was justified largely in economic terms.7 ' Even
on a progressive interpretation that takes into account changing values, the
economic objectives underlying section 121 still seem to have significant
currency today.
Yet free trade can also serve political objectives. In both the United
States and Australia, the goal of fostering political unity among the
states has been identified as motivating the free trade commitments in
those countries' constitutions. 76 In the European Union as well, free trade
has been viewed by many as a prelude to and facilitator toward greater
political unification. According to this line of reasoning, economic
protectionism is incompatible with political union. It indicates a hostility
to outsiders that undermines notions of common citizenship. In the words
of one scholar, protectionism "is the economic equivalent of war."7 7 This
is further underscored when one considers the potential for provinces
to engage in escalating acts of protectionism in a cycle of retaliation, a
fear that has actually manifested itself from time to time in Canadian
history.7' This kind of hostility undermines political unity. Furthermore,
constitutionalized free trade can also be seen as a means of protecting the
interests of outsiders who are not represented in the political institutions of
a given jurisdiction. 79 Due to the electoral incentives they face, provincial
legislatures and governments might be tempted to enact policies that
benefit constituencies within the province at the expense of those outside
the province. Differential tax rates or preferential regulatory treatment for
in-province parties are two examples of policies that might follow from
these incentives. Constitutional protection of free trade could be seen as
a means of preventing this type of political pathology, in a manner that
reinforces the common citizenship of all Canadians.
Political rationales along these lines were clearly present in the
arguments of Confederation-era politicians. The case for free trade at
Confederation was not expressed solely in economic terms. Free trade
was also seen as a way to promote political union among the British North

74.

McGregor, supra note 15. CanadianFree TradeAgreement, supra note 15.

75. See Bob Weber, "Premiers agree to 'historic' interprovincial trade deal but details on changes
unclear" (22 July 2016), online: National Post <www.nationalpost.com>.
76. Regan, supra note 68 at 1112-1116; Simpson, supra note 68 at 463-465.
77.

Regan, ibid, at 1113.

78. Ibid at 1114; Simpson, supra note 68 at 464. The "chicken and egg war" leading up to the
ManitobaEgg Reference, supra note 58, is but one example of an escalating internal trade dispute
from Canada's history. See Hogg, supranote 58 at 21-19.
79. Ely, supra note 68 at 83-84; KathleenM Sullivan & NoahFeldman, ConstitutionalLaw, l8thed
(St Paul: Foundation Pres, 2013) at 221-222.
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American colonies. For instance, George Brown argued as follows on 8
February 1865:
If a Canadian goes now to Nova Scotia or New Brunswick, or if a citizen
of these provinces comes here, it is like going to a foreign country. The
customs officer meets you at the frontier, arrests your progress, and
levies his imposts on your effects. But the proposal now before us is to
throw down all barriers between the provinces-to make a citizen ofone,
citizen of the whole...."o

This argument from Brown, a key politician at the time of Confederation,
draws an explicit link between internal free trade and a conception of
common citizenship. Other Confederation-era politicians also referenced
the idea that restricted trade meant treating other colonies in a "hostile"
manner, as "foreign" nations," and that commercial union would bring
together provinces belonging "to the same nation." 82 Among the goals of
free trade at Confederation, then, was the aim of reinforcing the political
union among the provinces.
Like the economic goals associated with free trade, the imperative of
fostering political unity among Canadian provinces and regions has not
noticeably diminished with time. National unity remains an important
Canadian preoccupation, and to this day rhetoric around removing
provincial trade barriers is often wrapped in the mantle of encouraging
national unity as well as economic prosperity.83 Accordingly, even
allowing for changing values, it is possible to articulate both a political
and an economic purpose underlying the section 121 free trade provision.

80. Janet Ajzenstat et al, eds, Canadak Founding Debates, Paperback ed (Toronto: University of
Toronto Press, 2003) at 135 [emphasis added].
81. Comeau, supra note 1 at paras 93, 98, 100, citing speeches by Alexander Galt on November
1, 1864, Lord Carnarvon on 19 February 1867, and Charles Adderley on 28 February 1867. The
speeches, originally cited by Blue, "Long Overdue," supra note 46, may be found in Whalen, supra
note 70 at 142; UK, HL, Parliamentary Debates, 3rd ser, vol 185, col 557-82 (19 February 1867); UK,
HC, Parliamentary Debates, 3rd ser, vol 185, col 1090-1 (27 February 1867).
82. Comeau, supra note 1, citing a speech by John A Macdonald on 6 February 1865. The speech,
originally cited by Blue, "Long Overdue," supra note 46 at 173, may be found in Canada, Parliament,
ParliamentaryDebates on the Subject ofthe Confederation ofthe British North America Provinces at

27.
83. See, e.g., Senate Internal Trade Report, supra note 13, epigraph: "As a fundamental right,
Canadians should be able to practise their profession or trade, operate a business whose goods and
services cancross provincial/territorialborders, and purchase goods and servicesbothfreely and without
penalty anywhere in this great country. The inability to do any of these diminishes us as a country,
and makes citizens and businesses more tied to their region than to their nation." A constitutional
amendment aimed at strengthening s 121 that was proposed by the Mulroney government in the early
1990s was similarly couched in the unifying rhetoric of common "economic citizenship." See Shaping
Canadas Future Together: Proposals(Ottawa: Supply and Services, 1991), cited by Schneiderman,
supra note 63 at 126.
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The provision aims at furthering economic efficiency, but also at fostering
political unity by reinforcing the importance of common citizenship,
and ruling out acts of economic hostility rooted in parochial political
considerations.
IV. Lessons from comparativejurisprudence
Before setting out a proposed interpretation of section 121, I wish to pause
briefly to identify certain lessons that might be drawn from the experiences
of the United States and Australia with constitutionalized free trade
extending to non-tariff barriers. These are comparable federations, each
with its own extensive body of constitutional free trade jurisprudence. In
Australia, this jurisprudence has been built around the first clause of section
92 of the Constitution, which states: "On the imposition of uniform duties
of customs, trade, commerce, and intercourse among the States, whether
by means of internal carriage or ocean navigation, shall be absolutely
free."" In the United States, constitutional free trade jurisprudence has
mostly, though not exclusively," been built upon the so-called Dormant
Commerce Clause. This is essentially a structural corollary of the
Interstate Commerce Clause.8 6 The idea is that since the Constitution
grants Congress the power to regulate interstate commerce, it should be
interpreted as denying this power to the states. Accordingly, states are seen
to be under fairly strict constitutional limits in their ability to discriminate
against interstate trade, or even to burden it unduly. Considerations of
space make a full exposition of these countries' approaches impossible."
In what follows, I wish merely to highlight three lessons that emerge from
their jurisprudence.
1.

Courts must determine a mechanismfor distinguishingpermissible
trade barriersfrom impermissible trade barriers.
The first point relates to the kind of doctrinal development that the
consideration of non-tariff barriers requires. In parts of his judgment,
the trial judge in Comeau seems to underestimate the complexity of the
problem, simply stating that section 121 prohibits both tariff-based and
non-tariff barriers alike. But non-tariff barriers, understood to encompass
any policy or government action that impedes trade across borders, come
in many different forms, including the simple fact of regulatory standards
that differ from one jurisdiction to the next. As a result, drawing a balance
84.

Commonwealth ofAustralia ConstitutionAct 1900 (UK), 63 & 64 Vict, c 12.

85. See also Privileges and Immunities Clause, US Const art IV, § 2.
86. US Const art I, § 8, cl 3.
87. For those interested in a general overview of each country's approach, see Ratnapala & Crowe,
supra note 55 at 303-315; Chemerinsky, supranote 55 at 443-478.
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between the economic regulatory authority of individual jurisdictions, on
the one hand, and a commitment to free trade, on the other, is a central
preoccupation of all free trade arrangements, whether they come in the
form of constitutional provisions or international agreements. In light of
this fact, and in light of the commitment to federalism in Australia, the
United States, and Canada, it would neither be practical nor desirable to
eliminate all non-tariff barriers. In both the United States and Australia,
doctrine has been developed targeting certain types of non-tariff barriers,
particularly those that can be labelled "discriminatory" or "protectionist." 88
Even in Australia, where the constitutional text relating to free trade is
uncompromising, requiring that trade and commerce among the states be
"absolutely free," a body of jurisprudence has been developed permitting
some non-tariff barriers and prohibiting others.89
2. Courts arefaced with an importantjurisprudentialchoice as to the
level and type of scrutiny to apply to trade barriers.
This second point follows from the first. Given that some non-tariff barriers
must be permitted, a means of distinguishing permitted from proscribed
barriers must be developed. Both Australia and the United States have
adopted approaches that are based in some sense on the proportionality of
measures that give rise to trade barriers, though the jurisdictions differ in
the level of scrutiny applied.90
In Australia, the modem approach to the section 92 free trade
provision rests on the idea that the provision protects interstate trade
from discriminatory protectionism. 91 Measures that discriminate in a
protectionist manner against out-of-state trade, either directly or indirectly,
so as to impose a burden on this trade, are presumptively unconstitutional. 92
However, burdens on interstate trade that do not aim at protectionist
objectives but which might otherwise be considered protectionist may
nevertheless be upheld if they are "appropriate and adapted" to a legitimate
88. See, e.g., Cole v Whitfield (1988) 165 CLR 360 at 398 (HCA) [Cole];Philadelphiav New Jersey,
437 US 617 at 623-625 (1978).
89. Ratnapala & Crowe, supra note 55 at 304-305.
90. Gonzalo Villalta Puig, "A European Saving Test for Section 92 of the Australian Constitution"
(2008) 13 DeakinL Rev 99 at 106-112; Jeremy Kirk, "Constitutional Guarantees, Characterisation and
the Concept of Proportionality" (1997) 21 Melbourne UL Rev 1 at 9, 12-16; Simpson, supra note 68
at 455-462.
91. Cole, supra note 88 at 398.
92. The Court in Cole gave the following non-exhaustive list of means by which discriminatory
burdens of a protectionist kind have been imposed on interstate trade: "tariffs that increase the price
of foreign goods, non-tariff barriers such as quotas on imports, differential railway rates, subsidies
on goods produced and discriminatory burdens dealing with imports." Ibid at 393. See also Barley
MarketingBoard (NSW) v Norman (1990), 171 CLR 182 (HCA), upholding a scheme requiring the
sale of barley grown in the state to a marketing board as non-discriminatory.
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objective, specifically "the protection of the community from a real danger
or threat to its welfare or to the enhancement of its welfare."9 3 A recent
case has gone further, requiring that at least some burdens on interstate
trade actually be necessary to achieve such an objective.9 In Betfair, state
legislation prohibiting certain types of gambling exchanges was struck
down. Despite the fact that the legislation did not discriminate on its face
against out-of-state exchanges, its practical effect was to eliminate out-ofstate competition in a manner than was not necessary for the achievement
of the state's regulatory objectives.9
In the United States, different approaches are used for measures that
are classified as discriminatory and those that are not.9 6 A measure will be
classified as discriminatory if it expressly draws a distinction between instate and out-of-state actors.9 7 However, even "facially neutral" measures
can be characterized as discriminatory based on their purpose or effects.98
Discriminatory measures are subject to exacting review. They are only
upheld if they can be shown to be necessary to achieve an important
government purpose.9 9 By contrast, non-discriminatory measures that
burden interstate trade are subject to less searching review, though they
may still be struck down if the benefits of a measure are outweighed by
the burden it places on interstate trade.100 For instance, in Bibb v. Navajo
FreightLines, the Supreme Court struck down a state law requiring the
use of curved mudguards on semi-trailers.10 1 This created a burden on
interstate commerce, since straight mudguards were allowed in most other
states. The law was not found to be discriminatory, but was nevertheless
struck down on the basis that its negative effects on interstate commerce
outweighed any benefits of the measure. 1 0 2

93.
94.

CastlemaineTooheysLtdv South Australia (1990), 169 CLR 436 at 471-474 (HCA).
Betfair Pty Limitedv Western Australia, [2008] HCA 11 at paras 102-112 [Betfair]; Puig, supra

note 90 at 126-129.
95. Betfair, ibid at paras 106-112.
96. Chemerinsky, supra note 55 at 453.
97. See, e.g., Granholm v Heald, 544 US 460 at 476, 472-473 (2005); Oregon Waste Systems, Inc v
DepartmentofEnvironmental Quality ofthe State ofOregon, 511 US 93, 98-99 (1994); Philadelphia
v New Jersey, supra note 88 at 624.
98. See, e.g., Huntv Washington StateAppleAdvertising Commission, 432 US 333, 350-354 (1977);
C &A Carbone, Inc v Town of Clarkstown, 511 US 383, 390-392 (1994) [Carbone]. But see United
Haulers 'Association,Inc v Oneida-HerkimerSolid Waste ManagementAuthority, 550 US 330 (2007).
99. See, e.g., Dean Milk Co v City ofMadison, 340 US 349 at 354-357 (1951); Maine v Taylor, 477

US 131, 138-140 (1986); Carbone, ibid at 392-395.
100. Pike v Bruce Church, Inc, 397 US 137, 142 (1970); Minnesota v Clover LeafCreamery Co, 449
US 456, 473 (1981); American Trucking Associations, Inc v Michigan Public Service Commission,

545 US 429 at 433 (2005).
101. 359 US 520 (1959).
102. Ibid at 529.
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As mentioned above, both these approaches can be classified as
adopting proportionality tests of some form.103 Both jurisdictions prohibit
measures that actually aim to discriminate against trade from outside
the jurisdiction. Accordingly, both require that regulations giving rise
to non-tariff barriers be rationally related to a valid objective other than
protectionism. Both jurisdictions then go beyond this, to a second level of
proportionality. They also assess the necessity of at least some negative
effects on interstate trade. Where a measure that is rationally related to
a non-discriminatory objective nevertheless discriminates on its face
against interstate trade or gives rise to discriminatory effects, there is a
requirement in both countries that the discrimination in question be in
some sense necessary for the achievement of a valid, non-protectionist
objective. Assessing the purpose, rationality, and necessity of a measure
giving rise to atrade barrier is as far as the Australian approach goes.10 ' The
U.S. jurisprudence goes further, however, embracing outright balancing of
effects. Even where a measure giving rise to a trade barrier is found to be
neither discriminatory in its purpose nor in its effects, U.S. jurisprudence
still mandates a balancing of the state objective against any negative effect
on interstate commerce.
Rather than thinking in terms of the proportionality of regulatory
measures that burden interprovincial trade, it is also possible to deal with
the problem in conceptual terms, assessing whether a measure fits within
permitted categories of regulation or not. In his concurring opinion in
Murphy v. CPR Rand J. raises this as a possibility. His proposed approach
relies on a distinction between regulation that in essence or purpose relates
to provincial boundaries, on the one hand, and regulation that merely
addresses the "subsidiary features" of interprovincial trade:
I take s. 121, apart from customs duties, to be aimed against trade
regulation which is designed to place fetters upon or raise impediments
to or otherwise restrict or limit the free flow of commerce across the
Dominion as if provincial boundaries did not exist. That it does not
create a level of trade activity divested of all regulation I have no doubt;
what is preserved is a free flow of trade regulated in subsidiary features
which are or have come to be looked upon as incidents of trade. What is
forbidden is a trade regulation that in its essence andpurpose is related
to a provincialboundary.'

103. Puig, supra note 90 at 106-112; Kirk, supra note 90 at 12-16; Simpson, supra note 68 at 455462.
104. Pug, supranote 90 at 126-129.
105. Murphy v CPR, supra note 4 at 642 [emphasis added].
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Much more could be said about the approaches set out above. What should
be clear, however, is that courts face an important choice regarding the
level and type of scrutiny to apply to non-tariff barriers.
3. It is possible for the jurisprudence relating to non-tariffbarriersto
become highly complex and uncertain.
In both Australia and the United States, constitutional jurisprudence
relating to internal free trade has become complex, contentious, and
uncertain, spurring a great deal of litigation. In a landmark 1988 decision
that revamped the High Court of Australia's approach to the Australian
Constitution's section 92 free trade provision, which is in many ways an
analogue of Canada's section 121, the High Court wrote:
No provision of the Constitution has been the source of greater
judicial concern or the subject of greater judicial effort than s. 92. That
notwithstanding, judicial exegesis of the section has yielded neither
clarity nor certainty of operation. Over the years the Court has moved
uneasily between one interpretation and another in its endeavours to
solve the problems thrown up by the necessity to apply the very general
language of the section to a wide variety of legislative and factual
situations. 06
Similar observations could be made about the United States, where the
body of Dormant Commerce Clause jurisprudence is both very large and
difficult to fully reconcile.10 ' The contrast with Canada could not be starker.
By restricting the scope of section 121 to tariffs only, Gold Seal achieved
clarity and certainty, if nothing else. If section 121 is to be extended to
non-tariff barriers, care must be given to ensuring that the jurisprudence
associated with it does not become unduly complex or uncertain. The
experiences of Australia and the United States demonstrate that this is a
very real threat, indicating the need for doctrinal clarity and, to the extent
this is possible, simplicity.
V. Reconciling text, structure, andprinciples
In what follows, I tentatively propose a means of reconciling the important
insights relating to the text, historical context, and purpose of section
121 that emerge from R. v. Comeau with a contemporary understanding
of Canada's constitutional structure and the values of democracy and
federalism. In doing so I hope to propose answers to the unanswered
questions stemming from Comeau that I identified in a previous section,
including, first and foremost, the question of how, specifically, doctrine
106. Cole, supra note 88 at 383-384.
107. Chemerinsky, supra note 55 at 457-458.
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can be developed so as to police non-tariff barriers while also providing
reasonable clarity to governments and other actors.
At the outset, it should be noted that section 121, by its express terms,
deals only with barriers to trade in goods. Services are not "Articles of
...Growth, Produce, or Manufacture," and so barriers to interprovincial
mobility in relation to regulated occupations, for example, are beyond
the scope of section 121. Building on Rand J.'s approach, as well as
Australian and American jurisprudence, I would suggest two standards
for barriers to trade in goods: one for measures that discriminate against
interprovincial trade by creating special burdens based on geographic
distinctions, and one for measures that merely have the incidental effect of
burdening interprovincial trade. This mirrors the distinction Rand J. draws
between regulation that "in its essence or purpose is related to a provincial
boundary" and regulation of "subsidiary features" or "incidents" of trade.
Measures which can be said to discriminate against interprovincial trade,
either directly by referencing location or indirectly through the use of
proxies for location, should be subject to exacting scrutiny. In particular, in
order to be upheld such measures must be necessary for the achievement
of a significant, non-protectionist objective. By contrast, measures that
do not discriminate on their face, either directly or through proxies, but
merely have the effect of burdening interprovincial trade, should be
subject to lesser scrutiny. A requirement that such measures bear a rational
and functional relationship to a valid, non-protectionist objective is
sufficient."o' This approach aims at distinguishing between protectionist
measures, which are contrary to the text and purpose of section 121, and
justifiable exercises of regulatory authority, especially provincial powers
under section 92(13).
Examples may help. If a province imposed more restrictive rules for
the sale of wine produced inside the province than wine produced outside
the province, this would be seen to discriminate against out-of-province
trade on its face, in the sense that it imposes a burden solely on the basis
of location of origin. In order to be upheld, such a measure would have
to be found to be necessary for the achievement of a significant, nonprotectionist objective, such as health or public safety. A similar approach
would apply to regulations that create burdens using a proxy for location.
For instance, if British Columbia were to create more favourable rules for
the marketing of Pacific salmon as compared with other fish, this could

108. The "necessary" and "rational and functional" standards used here mirror those used in the
Supreme Court of Canada's ancillary power jurisprudence. See GeneralMotors of CanadaLtd v City
NationalLeasing, [1989] 1 SCR 641 at 668-671, 58 DLR (4th) 255.
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be seen to relate to a proxy for province of origin. In order to be upheld it
would have to be shown to be necessary in order to achieve a significant,
non-protectionist objective. By contrast, most trade barriers that emerge
simply as a result of differences in regulatory standards across provinces
would be subject to the lower "rationality" standard. For example, setting
regulatory standards for tires used in transport trucks that differ from one
province to the next would have the effect of impeding interprovincial
trade.10 9 Yet regulatory standards of this nature do not draw distinctions
that are based on location or a proxy for location. They should be upheld
as long as they bear a rational and functional relationship to a valid, nonprotectionist objective, such as road safety.110
This approach stays mostly at a "conceptual" level, assessing the
types of distinctions drawn by regulatory measures. Unlike the American
Dormant Commerce Clause jurisprudence it avoids directly weighing
the beneficial effects of a given regulatory measure against the burden
it places on trade, and only goes so far as to assess "necessity" in overt
cases of discrimination against interprovincial trade. While some have
advocated approaches that incorporate a balancing of the benefits of
regulations against burdens on trade,"' there are reasons to be skeptical
of these approaches. First, such balancing may require a higher degree
of economic policy-making expertise than is normally expected from the
judiciary. Governments, and in particular the federal government, are in
a better position to weigh economic effects of this nature than the courts.
Second, focusing on effects rather than on the distinctions drawn by
legislation leads to problems with complexity and indeterminacy that have
bedeviled the jurisprudence in the United States, and to a lesser extent in
Australia. Indeed, it has been observed that indeterminacy follows from
any approach based on balancing effects, because such approaches require
courts to weigh incommensurables: the "burden" on interjurisdictional
trade vs. the "benefits" of the regulation.1 12
Third, this kind of policy-based balancing requires courts to effectively
assess the merits of the regulations in question, because the central question
is whether the benefits outweigh the burdens. This may be seen as a task

109. The example comes from the Senate Internal Trade Report, supra note 13 at 29.
110. These examples all relate to barriers to trade in goods, as opposed to services. While trucking
is a service, it is a service that deals with the transportation of goods, such that regulatory measures
relating to it could give rise to barriers to trade in goods.
111. Vegh, supra note 58 at 393-400; Puig, supra note 90 at 119-125; Gregoire Webber, "The
Ancillary Power Doctrine: An Analogy with Section 1 of the Charter" (2002) 36 RJT 121 at 150-167.
112. Bendix Autolite Corp v Midwesco Enterprises, Inc, 486 US 888 at 897, Scalia J, dissenting

(1988).
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more properly undertaken by elected officials in a democracy. This is an
especially important point if one recognizes that the federal power over
trade and commerce includes some power to regulate interprovincial trade
barriers, as has been suggested.11 3 On questions that come down to openended policy choices, it may be preferable for the elected federal Parliament
and government to take the lead, rather than unelected judges. One should
also bear in mind that the standard under section 121 is the constitutional
minimum, and it does not rule out either concerted provincial action or
unilateral federal action to further reduce trade barriers.
While the proposed approach is conceptual, it avoids some of the
pitfalls of formalism or nominalism, which at its worst simply affixes
conceptual labels to sets of facts in order to rationalize results that are
driven by other considerations."' Despite the ascendancy of balancing tests
in constitutional jurisprudence, there remains a place for analysis based on
conceptual categories."' As long as the categories are clearly defined and
their justifications are understood, conceptual categorization can provide a
reasonable amount of ex ante certainty, in a way that compares favourably
to more open-ended balancing tests. In an area of constitutional doctrine
that has the potential to affect much of Canada's economic regulatory
structure, and which other countries' jurisprudence has shown to have
the potential to become highly complex and indeterminate, providing
certainty to economic and political actors should be a key concern. In this
area, conceptualism has much to recommend itself
Finally, section 121 should apply onlyto provincial legislatures. Itshould
not bind the federal Parliament, despite some past judicial statements to
this effect.11 6 The text of the ConstitutionAct, 1867 supports this approach.
Parliament's section 91 powers are set out in terms that expressly state that
they exist "notwithstanding anything in this Act." Accordingly, there is a
strong textual argument to be made that Parliament's section 91(2) power
to regulate trade and commerce, which encompasses interprovincial trade,

&

113. Senate InternalTrade Report, supra note 13 at 38.
114. Webber, "The Ancillary Power Doctrine," supra note 111 at 15 1-152.
115. See lan B Lee, "Balancing and its Alternatives: Jurisprudential Choice, Federal Securities
Legislation and the Trade and Commerce Power" (2011) 50 CanBus LJ 72 at 80-92; Gregoire Webber,
"Proportionality, Balancing, and the Cult of Constitutional Rights Scholarship" (2010) 23(1) CaniL
Jur 179.
116. Atlantic Smoke Shops, supra note 4 at 569; Agricultural ProductsMarketing Reference, supra

note 4 at 1267.
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trumps any limits laid out in section 121.117 The purposes underlying
section 121 also support this approach. In terms of political purposes,
federal regulation that burdens interprovincial trade does not pose the
same threat to national unity as provincial regulation, in that, for instance,
there is little worry of escalating acts of retaliation, or of provinces seeking
to benefit local interests at the expense of other Canadians. In terms of
economic efficiency, the federal Parliament is theoretically in a position to
consider the welfare of all Canadians in weighing the benefits and costs of
a given regulation burdening interprovincial trade, unlike provinces which
might be unduly swayed by parochial concerns.
In my view, the overall approach outlined above remains faithful to
the text and purpose of section 121, in a manner that is also consistent with
a contemporary understanding of constitutional principles and values, and
the structure of Canadian federalism. Many of the economic benefits of
free trade would be secured on this approach, in a manner that extends
well beyond prohibiting outright tariffs. Moreover, the political objectives
of free trade relating to national unity would likewise be achieved.
Provinces would be mostly unable to act overtly or through the use of
proxies to disadvantage interprovincial trade. This limits the potential
for acts of hostility among provinces, or for provinces to impose burdens
on outsiders in order to serve local interests, helping to encourage a
conception of common economic citizenship among all Canadians. At the
same time, this approach would support the basic structure of Canadian
federalism. Provinces would remain largely free to exercise their section
92(13) jurisdiction over property and civil rights, with only clear acts of
protectionism or truly indefensible incidental trade barriers ruled out. In
other words, the potential threat that section 121 poses to local regulatory
differences that pursue legitimate local objectives would be mitigated.
Finally, this approach is consistent with the important constitutional
principle of democracy. It goes only as far as is necessary in restricting the
power of democratic majorities to regulate economic matters in the public
interest. Provincial legislatures, which pose the greater threat to economic
unity, are constrained from acting on protectionist impulses. By contrast,
the federal Parliament, as the body that represents Canadians as a whole,

117. Ian Blue notes that despite the existence of this language ins 91, s 96 of the ConstitutionAct,
1867 has been found to trump Parliament's s 91 powers. Blue, "Long Overdue," supra note 46 at 179.
While this is true, the Supreme Court's s 96 jurisprudence is somewhat anomalous. It relies heavily
on the constitutional principle of the rule of law, and has little basis in the constitutional text. See
MacMillanBloedelLtdv Simpson, [1995] 4 SCR 725 at 751-754, 130 DLR (4th) 385. Inmy view, this
jurisprudence does not provide a basis for disregarding the express words of s 91 in relation to other
provisions of the ConstitutionAct, 1867.
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would be unconstrained by section 121 in regulating interprovincial trade.
This ensures that the people, acting through their elected representatives,
ultimately have the last word on economic regulation.
A possible objection might be raised at this stage. One could argue that
giving such weight to the original meaning and purpose of section 121 is
inappropriate since Canadian federalism jurisprudence long ago departed
from the framers' plan for a centralized federation. This is seen in the
narrow construction given to the federal trade and commerce power, and
perhaps even more clearly in the claim that the federal power to reserve or
disallow provincial legislation has fallen into desuetude. Seen in this light,
the narrow interpretation of section 121 coming out of Gold Seal is just one
part ofthe broader shift toward decentralization and away from constraints
on provincial power. Further, the decentralizing shifts in the jurisprudence
have been confirmed by political practice." On this view, the narrow Gold
Seal approach ought to be retained because it accords with a trend toward
decentralization that has long been accepted by political actors at all levels
of government.119
This approach ought to be rejected, mainly because section 121 is not
solely, or even principally, concerned with the division of powers. Section
121 is about guaranteeing the commitment to free trade that was at the core
of the bargain at Confederation, a commitment that continues to accord
with contemporary Canadian values. To the extent that section 121 has
incidental practical effects on the division of federal and provincial spheres
ofjurisdiction, these can be mitigated through the approach outlined above.
Provincial authority should only be restricted to the extent that this is truly
necessary to maintain the integrity of the common market. However, to

118. For instance, in the early 1990s the Government of Canada proposed an amendment to s 121
that would have prohibited any measures that impeded the mobility of persons, capital, services, and
goods within Canada. This implicitly recognized existing jurisprudence limiting the scope of s 121.
See Shaping Canadak Future Together: Proposals, supra note 83. More recent initiatives, such as
the 2016 federal-provincial accord on trade barriers might also seem to reflect a view that eliminating
these barriers is a matter for the political branches of government to work out. That said, it is probably
more correct to say that politicians are responding to the circumstances created by the courts rather
than necessarily endorsing the Gold Seal approach to s 121.
119. The argument that s 121 has itself fallen into "desuetude" was correctly rejected by the trial
judge. Comeau, supra note 1 atparas 169-174. Unlike the federal reservation and disallowance powers,
which political actors have unilaterally refrained from exercising, the restrictive interpretation given
to s. 121 came from the judiciary. Political actors have merely responded to the conditions created
by Gold Seal. Moreover, it would be a stretch to say that a political consensus emerged favouring
the narrow Gold Seal interpretation of s 121. For instance, the formal constitutional amendment to s
121 proposed by the Mulroney government in the 1990s would have repudiated the courts' narrow
interpretation of s 121. Ibid. On the necessary conditions for constitutional amendment by desuetude,
see Richard Albert, "Constitutional Amendment by Desuetude" (2014) 62 Am J Comp L 641 at 673675.
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insist on the formalistic Gold Seal interpretation of section 121 in order
to avoid having any effect whatsoever on the division of powers would be
to unaccountably privilege one set of constitutional values over another. It
would also freeze our understanding of the Constitution in time, with the
late 20th century rather than 1867 as the reference point.
Conclusion
Judge LeBlanc's opinion inR. v. Comeau,building upon the scholarly work
of Ian Blue, makes a very strong case that section 121 of the Constitution
Act, 1867 prohibits both tariffs and non-tariff barriers alike. The text,
purpose, and historical context of section 121 all support this position. Yet
the decision also leaves important questions unanswered. We are left to
wonder how this interpretation affects the structure of Canadian federalism,
as well as how a 21st century understanding of constitutional values,
including democracy and federalism, should inform our interpretation of
section 121. Most urgently, Judge LeBlanc fails to address the question of
how doctrine can be developed so as to appropriately distinguish between
permissible and impermissible non-tariff barriers. These questions will
likely occupy the minds of the judges hearing the appeal from the Comeau
decision. In this paper, I have provided some tentative answers. No doubt,
in the months to come, other approaches will be suggested. It seems that
with the "New Brunswick beer case," Canada may be approaching an
important constitutional moment, in which the issue of interprovincial
trade barriers is finally addressed. Let's drink to that.

